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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 16/05/2006

Accident number: 143

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 15/10/1997

Where it occurred: Shatory Village,
Sarozah District,
Paktika Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: dry/dusty
grass/grazing area
soft

Date record created: 13/02/2004

Date last modified: 13/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly
available. The following summarises its content.
Victim No.1 had been a deminer for three years. Victim No.2 had been a deminer for six
months. Both victims were reported to have attended a revision course eight months before
[despite one only having been employed for six]. Both victims had been on leave 24 days
before. The ground at the site was described as soft agricultural land. A photograph showed
flat land with dry clumps of grass.
The investigators determined that a dog had indicated a reading and Victim No.1 used his
detector at the site and got two readings 35cm apart. He marked one of the indications and
uncovered a MK 7 AT mine. Thinking that the second reading must be a fragment, he began
investigating it carelessly and detonated the mine. His bayonet was "lost".
The Assistant Group Leader said the deminer reacted violently when he found the AT mine
and the bayonet flew from his hand, landing on the PMN.
The victim's partner (Victim No.2) said that Victim No.1 was working properly and was
marking the cleared area prior to changing over duties when the accident occurred.
Victim No.1 said that he was detecting and got two readings. After finding an AT mine at one
reading he was pulling a bush from the area of the second reading when the mine went off.
The demining group said that the victim was prodding for an AT mine located by a dog.
When he changed position and lifted his helmet to shout "mine", he leant on his shovel in the
uncleared area and let off a PMN.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that Victim No.1 did not mark the second detector reading
properly and was working in a squatting position when the ground was suitable for working
prone. They decided that the victims did not maintain the correct safety distance so two were
injured by one blast, and that they were not wearing their helmets when the accident
occurred. As a result they decided that the team Sub-Commander had allowed the deminers
to ignore correct procedure (the Group Leader was sick on the day so only his assistant was
on duty). They also commented that the survey map of the site made no mention of the
presence of AP mines.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that readings must always be marked properly before
starting an investigation, that deminers must always wear the helmet when investigating a
reading, and that the safety distance between members of a breaching party must be
maintained.

Victim Report
Victim number: 184

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded
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Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: none

Thin, short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Eyes
severe Face
severe Fingers
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
Victim No.1's injuries were summarised as: serious injuries to eyes, face, fingers.
An insurance claim was submitted on 12th March 1998, saying that the victim had been
"blinded" in a mine accident.
No record on a compensation payment was found in June 1998.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because it is likely
that Victim No.1 was working carelessly and his errors went uncorrected. The proximity of
Victim No.2 to the blast should also have been corrected. The fact that neither victim was
wearing their helmet and visor would have been obvious to any observer, from which I infer
that field supervision was absent. The demining group's summary of the accident to the
insurers implies a carelessness about detail that should have been corrected.
It is possible that visors were not worn because they were too damaged to see through
properly (as was seen frequently during field visits in 1998, 1999), in which case the failure to
provide useable equipment may represent a serious management failing.
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or
enforce their own standards may be seen as a further management failing.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
Gathering of further accident and medical treatment detail was prevented by the UN
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database.
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